Ukraine is entering this winter with a significantly higher level of preparedness than in the previous three wartime seasons. This preparation is systematic, not symbolic.
Stocks of critical equipment, backup solutions for generation, transmission and distribution, as well as a large-scale programme of engineering reinforcement for energy facilities, are creating a level of resilience that did not exist before. Planning approaches have become more structured: past experience has been taken into account, several possible scenarios have been assessed, and cross-sector coordination has been strengthened.
This does not mean that the threats have disappeared. But it does mean that the state and system operators are entering the season from stronger positions than at any time since the start of the full-scale war.
What Has Changed in the Protection of Energy Facilities
One of the most important changes has been the substantial expansion of protective infrastructure. Today, a large number of high-capacity transformers are protected by concrete shelters capable of withstanding kamikaze drones and fragmentation impact. According to official information, more than 70% of such transformers at Ukrenergo substations now have an appropriate level of engineering protection.
The scale of these works is also noteworthy. More facilities are now covered by protective measures than in previous years, and protection is being implemented comprehensively, taking into account both the engineering component and cooperation with defence structures.
There are already tangible results. In a number of cases, new fortifications have protected scarce equipment after several consecutive attacks. The State Agency for Restoration has now taken an additional 120 energy facilities under protection, with UAH 6 billion already allocated from the state budget reserve fund for this purpose. Protection involves a complex and integrated approach, including air defence, physical protection, spare equipment, coverage by mobile groups and other measures.
New Types of Threats
However, the aggressor is also adapting and changing the tactics of aerial attacks. From the large-scale “carpet” strikes of 2022, the enemy has shifted towards targeted attacks on individual facilities.
Recently, there has been an increase in concentrated drone and missile attacks against single power system facilities. At the same time, systematic shelling of frontline and border regions continues, destroying both major power plants and energy infrastructure.
In the 2022–2023 season, attacks were mostly massive and relatively chaotic, targeting large facilities across the country. Since spring 2023, however, the enemy has increasingly used targeted and concentrated strikes aimed at “cutting off” specific regions from the power system.
In 2024–2025, another phase was added: continuous terror against frontline and border regions, as well as targeted strikes on key substations connected to the evacuation of power from nuclear power plants. The enemy concentrates dozens of drones or missiles on a single energy facility. This tactic makes protection more difficult, as even well-reinforced facilities cannot always withstand several consecutive hits.
The cascade of hydropower plants on the Dnipro River also remains at risk: out of six hydropower plants, only one is currently operating at full capacity. This is a significant blow to the system’s flexible and balancing capacity. Thermal generation suffered dozens of attacks in October alone, and natural gas production facilities were also damaged.
All these factors increase the risks of passing through the winter period. It is enough to note that since the beginning of the full-scale war, Ukraine’s power system has lost more than 18 GW of capacity as a result of occupation, destruction and damage.
Decentralized Solutions as the Basis of Resilience
Despite these risks, the situation is not catastrophic. The systemic trend towards decentralization continues. Enterprises and communities are deploying solar power plants, energy storage systems, mobile turbines and microgrids.
Critical infrastructure facilities have become particularly active in this process. Water utilities, in particular, are increasingly switching to renewable energy sources to guarantee uninterrupted water supply during regular power outages. The installation of photovoltaic modules makes it possible to provide a basic level of electricity supply: some water utilities have already installed solar power plants, while others are preparing project documentation for the use of renewables.
Such initiatives need to be scaled up. Investment in decentralized generation, the creation of buffer fuel reserves, the construction of new power plants and the completion of integration with the EU power system should become part of strategic planning — not merely a response to short-term threats.
In other words, Ukraine needs to move from a reactive to a proactive strategy, stimulating investment through public-private partnerships and financing from international financial institutions. This would allow the country not only to respond to current challenges, but also to lay the foundation for a sustainable energy system in the long term.
Against the background of large-scale losses, the pace of commissioning new power plants still does not meet the country’s needs. Over the past two years, 1.5 GW of new flexible capacity has been commissioned. However, this is only half of the required 3 GW of flexible generation being built under full-scale war conditions. At the same time, these new capacities are aligned with today’s challenges: they represent decentralized generation, which is less vulnerable under constant aerial attacks.
Energy imports also play a major role. Due to the destruction of gas production facilities, Ukraine has had to make significant external purchases, and this issue is being addressed. Part of the funding for these costs has already been secured through international support, while additional financing is still being sought.
Finally, electricity imports from the EU are currently a powerful stabilizing factor. After synchronization with the European ENTSO-E grid, Ukraine gained the ability to quickly attract reserve volumes of electricity. In October alone, 360,000 MWh of electricity was imported, allowing the system to be rapidly balanced after another wave of attacks on energy facilities.
A Cold Winter and a Hot Front
Ukraine’s power system is operating under extremely difficult conditions. At the same time, it has become more flexible, better adapted to hybrid threats and more technologically equipped than ever before.
Over all the years of the war, the power system came close to a blackout only once — in autumn 2022. This is the result of enormous work by engineers, dispatchers, repair crews, managers and partners who together are building a line of energy defence.
The winter of 2025–2026 will be a test. But this winter is no longer about fear and despair. It is about experience, organization and strategic endurance.
Ukraine is holding the energy front — and continues to strengthen it every day.
Author: Yevhen Korf, Director of NVP ENERGO-PLUS LLC.
Source: “Ekonomichna Pravda“, Energobusiness, EnergyClub.
