The intensity of airstrikes targeting Ukraine’s power system infrastructure shows no signs of abating. In December 2025 alone, the aggressor targeted power generation facilities and electricity distribution networks in the Kyiv metropolitan area, Odesa and the surrounding region, as well as several regions in central Ukraine.
Unfortunately, for most consumers today, a “stable grid” does not mean the complete absence of power outages. Rather, it means outages of shorter duration and lower severity, predictable schedules, and clearly defined priorities that are understood and accepted by society.
Large-scale attacks have not stopped. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce the impact of each subsequent strike and shorten recovery times from months to days or weeks.
After the Strike: Stabilize First, Restore Second
Ukraine operates thousands of medium-voltage substations operating at voltage levels of up to 35 kV. According to the Ministry of Energy, there are approximately 3,500 such facilities across the country. It is clear that constructing protective fortifications and providing air defence coverage for all of these facilities is simply not physically feasible. This is not a matter of insufficient commitment but rather a reflection of the real constraints imposed by available resources and time.
Accordingly, the approach should be simple: priority should be given to hardening approximately one hundred critical high-voltage nodes within Ukrenergo’s backbone transmission network, as these assets support the functioning of entire regions and large metropolitan areas. For all other facilities, the focus should be on rapid repairs, backup configurations, and mobile solutions. The objective is to achieve the maximum possible effect from every hryvnia invested and every hour of work performed.
The response algorithm is straightforward. During the first four to five days following an attack, emergency work is carried out across the network in order to restore at least a minimum level of electricity supply. This is followed by a longer yet equally critical phase lasting approximately 10–12 weeks, involving the replacement of transformers, circuit breakers, and switching equipment, as well as the restoration of high-voltage transmission lines and substations.
This is precisely where both time and hardware are currently in short supply. Manufacturing large-scale equipment takes months, while repair crews continue to operate under the constant threat of repeated strikes. As a result, the pace of recovery depends not only on funding, but also on logistics, security conditions, and the availability of reserve equipment and materials.
Reserves Depleted Within Two to Three Months
National reserves of critical equipment have been built up; however, the current intensity of attacks is exhausting these stockpiles within just a few months. Regional power companies, meanwhile, have even more limited inventories at their disposal.
As a result, the pace of planned recovery efforts is slowing. What yesterday could be resolved simply by removing damaged equipment and installing replacement units may tomorrow require waiting months for new equipment to be manufactured or attempting to repair the damaged components. This represents a direct risk of prolonged power outages during the winter period.
Kyiv provides a particularly clear example of this challenge. The city consumes between 1.5 and 2 GW of electricity, while its own generating capacity covers only approximately one quarter of total daily demand. The remaining supply is delivered through Ukraine’s integrated power system by means of high-voltage transmission lines and key transmission substations.
When these transmission corridors are damaged, local distribution networks become overwhelmed and are no longer capable of delivering the required volumes of electricity. As a result, Kyiv is forced to implement two to four stages of stabilisation outages, with consumers facing electricity interruptions lasting between 12 and 16 hours per day.
Critical Infrastructure Without Quotation Marks
Under these conditions, it is essential to understand that there will be no immediate solution. The only realistic path forward is a gradual reduction in the scale and duration of outages as key transmission nodes are progressively restored.
The first priority must be the fair allocation of available resources. Lists of critical facilities should be based on transparent and objective criteria. Whenever “pseudo-critical” businesses and institutions are granted priority status, households are left to face longer and more severe scheduled power outages.
A transparent reassessment process and the adoption of uniform criteria for the designation of critical facilities can significantly improve the situation and reduce existing imbalances without requiring additional generating capacity. The government has already initiated work in this area, and this should be regarded as a positive step.
Local Generation as a Lifeline
Distributed generation is far more than a fashionable term; it has become an essential line of defence for local communities. Almost 700 pieces of heat supply equipment have already been deployed.
According to the Government, a programme for the installation of 60 distributed generation facilities is already being launched with the support of international partners.
In particular, the programme includes the installation of:
- 33 combined heat and power (CHP) units with capacities ranging from 0.5 MW to 1.6 MW;
- 17 modular boiler houses with capacities ranging from 1 MW to 4 MW;
- 12 mobile boiler houses mounted on chassis, each with a capacity of 1 MW to 2 MW.
Priority is being given to healthcare facilities, water utilities, and district heating hubs. Combined heat and power (CHP) installations provide both heat and electricity, thereby reducing the need to transmit large volumes of power through damaged transmission corridors.
At the same time, private investment in renewable energy generation continues to grow. During the first three quarters of 2025 alone, more than 2 GW of solar panels were imported. The market has moved from a state of panic to one driven by economic considerations, as businesses and households calculate payback periods and install hybrid solar power systems equipped with battery storage. Imports of energy storage systems are also increasing.
However, there is also a downside. A significant share of this generation capacity remains outside the metering and monitoring system, meaning that system operators have no real-time visibility of it. As a result, demand forecasting becomes considerably more difficult. The priority now is to integrate this capacity into the system.
This will require several measures:
– smart metering and telemetry systems for businesses and condominium associations (HOAs);
– load management platforms with simple and transparent participation requirements;
– net billing arrangements and demand response (DR) programmes supported by clearly defined flexibility payments;
– standardised procedures for the rapid interconnection of cogeneration facilities and microgrids serving critical infrastructure.
A Pragmatic Path Forward: Actionable Steps and Success Metrics
Based on the considerations outlined above, it is possible to develop an approximate roadmap for restoring the normal operation of the power system.
In the short term (within 30 days), efforts should focus on restoring backbone transmission lines and key high-voltage substations. These are the facilities where replacing a single piece of equipment or completing a single repair can bring electricity back to entire regions. Elsewhere, mobile substations should be deployed and the first CHP units commissioned in the most severely constrained sections of the grid. At the same time, the review of the list of critical infrastructure facilities must continue, with all non-essential and unjustifiably prioritised entities removed. Throughout this process, the safety of repair crews must remain a top priority, because no transformer can be brought back into operation without the people who restore it.
Within the next one to three months, efforts should focus on scaling up the programme for 60 distributed generation facilities that has already been approved in cooperation with international partners. Replenishing inventories of equipment and spare parts is equally important in order to prevent lengthy delays caused by shortages of relatively small but critically important components. In parallel, clear and transparent demand response (DR) programmes should be introduced for businesses, enabling consumers to shift electricity consumption away from evening peak hours in exchange for appropriate compensation.
Within a three- to twelve-month timeframe, priority should be given to reinforcing the internal west–central–east transmission corridors in order to ensure that both imported electricity and domestic generation can reach supply-constrained regions. Large-scale deployment of smart metering systems and the introduction of digital platforms for monitoring and load management should proceed in parallel. At the same time, efforts should be intensified to integrate corporate photovoltaic (PV) systems and battery energy storage systems (BESS) into the common monitoring, metering, and dispatch infrastructure. In parallel, consideration should be given to relocating the most vulnerable network assets underground wherever technically and economically feasible, thereby improving the protection of critical energy facilities.
Progress can be assessed by answering a few straightforward questions:
- Have the number of outages and their duration decreased in each city?
- How many megawatts of local generation capacity have actually been commissioned this week?
- Are stocks of spare transformers and circuit breakers sufficient to sustain operations for at least several weeks?
- How many households and businesses have already been equipped with smart meters?
- How many participants are enrolled in demand response programmes, and to what extent have these measures reduced evening peak loads?
Results Without Illusions
We will not be able to fully protect every substation, every transmission tower, every switchgear unit, or every kilometre of transmission line. However, even today, we can identify the right nodes — those where a single intervention can restore electricity supply to hundreds of thousands of people.
We can rapidly deploy local generation capacity where the grid is at its weakest. We can ensure that private energy resources operate as an integral part of the system rather than in isolation from it. And we can protect the people who restore electricity supply — our repair crews.
Stability is built on discipline and clear priorities. Less rhetoric, more megawatts delivered to the right places at the right time. This is how the reliability of the power system can be restored, even under constant attack.
Author: Yevhen Korf, СEO of NVP ENERGO-PLUS LLC.
Sources: The Page, Liga.net, EnergyClub.
