Ukraine is importing record volumes of electricity from the EU, yet millions of consumers still remain without power for 12–16 hours or more. In other words, imports are available — but electricity is still not reaching households. This raises a logical question: where are the megawatts getting “lost”?
The paradox is actually quite simple: imports are not the same as “electricity in the socket”. They are only an additional source of capacity. For electricity to reach a specific district or building, transmission lines, substations and distribution networks must all be operational. And this is where the biggest problems are today.
The situation has been further aggravated by the fact that, after large-scale strikes in early December, the capacity of nuclear power plants — which provide the baseload generation of Ukraine’s power system — had to be reduced. According to the IAEA, damage to the networks led to some units being shut down or switched to reduced power output. This is why the issue of electricity imports has recently become a subject of intense discussion at all levels.
The Numbers Without Embellishment: Imports Are Rising, Exports Are Falling
November already showed a systemic gap. Electricity exports fell by 94% compared with October 2025, down to 5,300 MWh, and effectively stopped from November 11. It should be recalled that in October, Ukrainian electricity exports had already dropped by 85% compared with September. Imports, on the other hand, increased by 17% to approximately 415,000 MWh, reaching their highest level since the beginning of the year.
December data is, of course, not yet available. But it is already clear that Ukraine has remained a net electricity importer for the second month in a row. The supply structure has also changed somewhat: Hungary remains the largest supplier, as it was in October, accounting for around 44%. At the same time, the shares of Slovakia and Moldova have increased significantly — tenfold and twofold, respectively. Meanwhile, Poland and Romania have declined in the structure of electricity imports.
From December 1, the maximum available import capacity was increased from 2.1 GW to 2.3 GW. However, it should be noted straight away that both figures remain largely theoretical for now. In November, the average actual use of interconnection capacity was only about 27%, with peaks of up to 88% during isolated hours.
Megawatts Are Getting Stuck in the Grid: Five Reasons
In other words, the resource exists — but not always where and when it is needed. There are several key reasons why even available electricity does not reach the end consumer.
Damaged west-east transmission corridors. Massive attacks are destroying high-voltage transmission lines and key substations, making it physically difficult to move imported electricity from the west of the country to the centre, east and south.
A shortage of domestic generation during peak hours. Evening demand cannot be fully covered by limited generation and supply reserves. Imports help to some extent, but they cannot fully meet the need for flexible capacity, especially in areas where local networks are damaged.
Problems with system balancing. The power system operator, Ukrenergo, cannot rely on imports alone. Local reserves are needed to maintain frequency and respond to peak loads.
Supply priorities under shortage conditions. When capacity is insufficient, critical facilities are supplied first — hospitals, water utilities and transport infrastructure. Households are therefore subject to stricter hourly outage schedules.
Equipment supply and logistics. Transformers, circuit breakers and cable accessories are expensive and have long production lead times. Stocks are being depleted, and without them there is no reserve for quickly “debottlenecking” constrained nodes.
The market is also reacting to the deficit through prices. In November 2025, Ukraine’s day-ahead market became one of the most expensive in Europe, with a price of around EUR 140 per MWh. By comparison, the price in Sweden was approximately EUR 36 per MWh, and in France around EUR 43 per MWh.
This is not about the “greed” of sellers or suppliers. It is about a shortage of low-cost domestic supply and network constraints.
The European Context: Someone Else’s Surplus Is Not Our Insurance Policy
The EU is strengthening cross-border electricity flows, which helps reduce prices and improve flexibility. In 2024, France increased nuclear and hydropower generation and became the largest net exporter in the region.
But even France’s record surplus is not an automatic “magic pill” for Ukraine. The reason lies in the asymmetry of time and location: surpluses often occur during hours when Ukraine has a different load profile, and in network nodes from which megawatts cannot be quickly transferred to where they are needed.
Some EU countries also have electricity surpluses, especially during so-called solar and wind windows, and are likewise looking for ways to sell excess electricity. But the same problems arise: complex logistics, both in the EU and in Ukraine, and mismatched load profiles.
In other words, imports can be extremely useful, but they should not be viewed as a strategy for replacing Ukraine’s own flexible generation capacity.
When Outages May Start to Decrease
Still, the operational picture is not hopeless. Ukrenergo expects restrictions to be gradually reduced as damaged facilities are repaired, provided there are no new attacks.
The Government is synchronizing recovery works, the construction of protective structures, the creation of fuel reserves and the connection of cogeneration units to the grid. This will add local capacity where it is needed most.
The increase in import capacity to 2.3 GW does have an effect, but it is limited by internal network bottlenecks. The most immediate practical relief will come from connecting decentralized sources and restoring the grids.
No Illusions: How to Reduce Outages
In the coming weeks, the focus must be on speed and precision. First of all, transmission capacity must be restored in critical corridors and key substations, where replacing a single transformer or circuit breaker can bring tens of megawatts back to a city.
Mobile substations, field repair crews and rapid equipment logistics are a matter of hours and days — not months.
At the same time, cogeneration units, gas-fired piston-engine units and gas turbine installations must be connected to the grid in deficit-prone nodes. Where “black holes” of evening peak demand appear on the map, local generation can pick up the load.
Over the next several months, the key priority will be the transition to managed demand. Industry and large commercial consumers can smooth the load under clear rules and compensation mechanisms. This is not an abstraction: power limitation schedules already exist, but they need to be transformed into proper demand response programmes with predictable results.
Additional west-east corridors must also continue to be developed, along with additional switching nodes in the 330–750 kV network, local reserves around major cities and large substations. Energy storage systems near major nodes can support the system during two to three peak hours and reduce the duration of hourly outage schedules.
In the longer term, Ukraine needs game-changing capacity. This means 3.5–4 GW of new decentralized flexible generation located as close as possible to consumers. Gas-fired units, cogeneration clusters for heat and electricity, and microgrids for critical districts all make the system less dependent on one or two key nodes.
Engineering logic must go hand in hand with institutional logic: transparent corporate governance, stable settlement rules and fast procurement of critical equipment. Without trust, there will be no financing. Without financing, there will be no underground distribution points, reinforced interconnections or warehouses with reserve transformers.
What “Fewer Outages” Means in Practice
There is no magic button that can switch off hourly outage schedules overnight. A realistic scenario is a gradual reduction in the duration and depth of outages in those regions where:
- at least part of the west-east transmission corridors has been restored;
- local cogeneration or gas-fired units have been connected;
- managed demand programmes for businesses are operating;
- critical infrastructure is backed up by reserves.
This is a mosaic of solutions. Each element alone will not solve the problem, but together they produce a tangible effect.
A Conclusion Without Self-Deception
Import capacity of up to 2.3 GW can provide temporary relief, but it is by no means a cure-all. As long as high-voltage lines and transmission nodes remain damaged, an imported megawatt will not automatically become light in people’s homes.
The path to shorter outages lies in three rapid actions:
- repairing transformers and transmission lines quickly;
- connecting decentralized generation quickly;
- launching managed demand and local reserves quickly.
At the same time, Ukraine must invest in its own flexible capacity and in the development of both central and local grids. Record imports are a symptom of an open wound. That wound cannot be healed by interconnection figures alone, but by the systematic rehabilitation of networks and the restoration of trust in the rules of the game.
Author: Yevhen Korf, Director of NVP ENERGO-PLUS LLC.
Source: Енергобізнес, EnergyClub.
