
The winter of 2025 will present another major challenge for Ukraine’s power sector. The aggressor continues to target critical infrastructure, while even the western regions of Ukraine — previously considered relatively secure — are increasingly coming under attack.
In these circumstances, the question of winter preparedness takes on particular significance: how resilient is the energy system, and will there be sufficient resources to ensure electricity and heating for the population?
The Persistent Threat of Attacks
Following the so-called “energy ceasefire” in the spring of 2025, nearly 3,000 strikes against energy infrastructure facilities were recorded within just a few months, ranging from large-scale coordinated attacks to localized strikes. Under sustained attack are not only power generation facilities, but also natural gas transmission infrastructure, electrical substations, and electricity distribution networks. The aggressor seeks to disrupt not only power generation, but also the transportation and delivery of energy resources, particularly natural gas.
The strikes are deliberately timed to coincide with the final stage of the winter preparedness campaign. This follows the pattern observed in previous years, when damage to major power generation facilities and electricity distribution networks was intended to create a generation shortfall.
At the same time, experience has shown that even after severe attacks, power supply can often be restored within hours or days by Ukrainian energy specialists.
Experience from Previous Years
In 2022, Ukraine experienced the most extensive power outages, with blackouts lasting for several hours across most regions of the country. Over time, however, damaged generating capacity was restored, and a number of facilities previously considered inoperable were successfully returned to service.
The summer of 2025 demonstrated the effectiveness of these efforts. Despite regular attacks, no large-scale electricity supply restrictions were imposed, including for industrial and commercial consumers. Consumers in most regions did not experience interruptions to electricity supply, while outages in frontline and border regions remained limited in duration.
Ukraine’s power system has adapted to operating under wartime conditions. Well-coordinated operating procedures implemented by the National Power Company Ukrenergo and regional electricity distribution system operators enable rapid load redistribution and the timely deployment of backup power sources.
Government Investment and International Support
The Government is currently prioritizing the protection of critical infrastructure. In particular, UAH 630 million has been allocated from the state reserve fund for the construction of protective structures around electrical substations in the Zaporizhzhia region. The initiative is expected to enhance the resilience and reliability of electricity and heat supply in one of the country’s most vulnerable regions.
Another important government initiative has been the large-scale deployment of Individual Heating Substations (IHSs) in buildings connected to district heating systems.
A modern Individual Heating Substation (IHS) is a fully automated, compact system installed directly within a building to regulate the supply of space heating and domestic hot water specifically for that facility. It receives the heat transfer fluid from the central network and, depending on weather conditions and consumption levels, adjusts the fluid temperature before delivering it to the building’s heating and hot water systems.
An Individual Heating Substation (IHS) is typically implemented as part of a broader building energy efficiency upgrade programme. Its deployment enables more efficient use of thermal energy while reducing heating and hot water costs for households. At the same time, the heat supplier receives operational data from individual heating substations, enabling it to optimize its own operating costs and reduce the load on the district heating network.
Another important area of support is the humanitarian and technical assistance provided by international partners. Azerbaijan alone has supplied Ukraine with more than 50 types of equipment, ranging from generators to power transformers. Overall, since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has received more than 23,000 tonnes of technical assistance from international partners.
Development of Distributed Generation
The decentralization of the energy sector is also playing a key role. Hundreds of new solar, wind, and gas-fired generation facilities have already been connected to the power grid.
In Kyiv, for example, a three-tier energy resilience model has been established, ranging from the deployment of additional gas turbines and equipping boiler houses with backup generators to providing thousands of residential buildings with backup power sources.
Hospitals that combine backup generators with solar photovoltaic (PV) systems and battery energy storage demonstrate that critical infrastructure can continue operating without interruption even during prolonged power outages. Such solutions not only enhance the resilience and security of critical infrastructure but also deliver cost savings and improve energy efficiency.
Power Balance and Strategic Objectives
Ukraine currently has reserve generation capacity, strategic stocks of critical equipment, and sufficient reserves of natural gas and coal. At the same time, a long-term energy strategy is being developed. By 2030–2032, Ukraine aims to phase out coal-fired thermal power plants and transition to a diversified energy mix based on nuclear, hydropower, natural gas, and renewable energy sources, supported by substantial battery energy storage capacity. This will not only enhance the resilience of the energy system but also enable Ukraine to rank among the five cleanest power systems in Europe.
As Ukraine enters the winter of 2025, its power system is fundamentally different from the one that existed three years ago. Hardened by repeated attacks, reinforced through international assistance, and equipped with advanced technologies and decentralized local solutions, the system is significantly more resilient. Widespread power outages are likely only in the event of sustained, large-scale attacks on major thermal power plants (TPPs). However, the likelihood of a nationwide blackout is considered low.
The combination of protective infrastructure, modernization efforts, international support, and the expansion of decentralized generation provides the foundation for a more resilient energy system. Although the threat remains, Ukraine is demonstrating that it is well prepared for the winter season — with reserve capacity, well-established response procedures, and confidence in its ability to withstand future challenges.
Author: Vadym Lytvynenko, Executive Director of NVP ENERGO-PLUS LLC.
Source: Mind, bessarabiainform, The Page.